This post revisits the claim made, a year ago, that NAMA only requires a recovery in property values of 10% in 10 years. The 15% fall in home values since has already pushed that out and a further 10% fall in 2011, as is likely, means that NAMA will require a new boom – 4% a year, every year till 2020 – to break even.
This post reviews the (scant) latest information from NAMA’s second tranche. It discusses the problems caused by Anglo’s omission from the figures NAMA gives, before estimating the likely true haircut for the first two tranches. It then calculates the total fall in property values implied by the ever-rising haircuts, before discussing some good news, bad news and neutral news from all this for the taxpayer.
This post looks at the figures behind the first tranche of NAMA’s loans and whether they suggest that NAMA is driving a hard bargain for the taxpayer. It finds that the EU’s guidelines on discounting mean long-term economic value is ultimately lower than current value not higher. It also outlines how the first tranche of loans may be entirely unrepresentative of future tranches.
Recently, there have been some suggestions about NAMA buying up and renting out thousands of properties from its portfolio. This post goes through those suggestions and explores why it is a bad idea for the taxpayer, in that it amounts to doubling up on the NAMA gamble with developers as well as with the banks.
With the NAMA draft business plan released earlier this week, this post reviews a key topic that remains unaddressed: the low yields on residential property. It finds that yields are clearly lower – far lower – than the 6% assumed both at the start of the NAMA process and now, in its business plan.
This post looks at the numbers behind NAMA in more detail, producing estimates of how much is in different segments of Irish and international property markets. It also critiques the calculation of long-term economic value, which turns out to be based on about 5% of the loan book, and presents revised estimates based on a broader sets of loans and more realistic assumptions.
